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Farm Attacks or ‘White Genocide’? Interrogating the Unresolved Land Question in South 
Africa  
Abstract 
Apartheid South Africa was noted for historical land dispossession, domination of the white group 
and disempowerment of its black population. Post-apartheid South Africa has struggled to address 
the land-related structural and physical violence in the country. Despite the implementation of 
land reform programmes since 1994, land inequality and impoverishment of black South Africans 
persist. The government’s failure to use land reform as instruments for socio-economic 
empowerment engendered frustrations among the major targets of land reform, which have found 
expressions in farm attacks and murders. The subsequent instability in the farming sector and 
categorization of farm attacks as ‘white genocide’ has shown the dynamics of the conversation, 
the urgency to combat farm attacks, erode the racial discourse and resolve the land question. 
Through unstructured interviews of key actors involved in the land and farm conflicts in KwaZulu-
Natal and Northern Cape, the article engaged the land attacks and ‘white genocide’ discourses 
and provided a nuanced understanding of the recurrence of the conflict in South Africa. I claimed 
that unequal access to land, and other intrinsic factors account for the destruction of lives and 
property on farms. In conclusion, while white farmers are the major victims of farm murder, the 
conceptualization of such as ‘white genocide’ does not entirely capture the reality. Among others, 
the government must inaugurate a ‘Panel of the Wise’, comprising of well-respected elders from 
all races to be involved in the peace processes on the farms. 
Key words: Farm Attacks, Farm Dwellers, Inequality, Land Reform, South Africa, White 
Genocide  
Introduction 
Land is a decisive factor in the South African socio-political and economic spheres. It is “a signifier 
of both material resources and collective identity (family, clan, community and nation), and thus 
a tenaciously unsettled matter of concern in contemporary South Africa” (Walker 2017: 22). The 
land and agricultural sectors are historically divided between the white group (who are 
predominantly owners of farms and land) and black South Africans (who are farm labourers and 
mostly landless). During colonialism and apartheid, Africans were disposed of land and restricted 
to the former homeland and Bantustans, which were unlivable, and tagged an “ecological 
Hiroshima” (Resane 2018: 3). 
After apartheid, the minority white population owned 87 per cent of the entire land (Walker with 
Dubb 2013). In 1996, South Africa was home to 40.5 million people (Black - 76.7 per cent, White 
- 10.9 per cent, Coloured - 8.9 per cent, Indian/Asian - 2.6 per cent, and Unspecified/other - 0.9 
2 
 
per cent) (Lahiff 2007: 3). By 2012, 67 per cent of the land was owned by white groupwhite group 
owned 67 per cent of the land, 15 per cent comprised of black communal areas; and 10 per cent 
was owned by the state owned 10 per cent, while 8 per cent was used for other purposes, including 
urban areas (Walker with Dubb 2013). Land inequality during apartheid and at present has 
engendered “systematic denudation and impoverishment of African people” (Department of Rural 
Development and Land Reform 2011: 3). Bob (2010) maintains that unequal access to social 
resource results from socio-economic and political processes that concentrate resources in the 
hands of the minority. 
Across Africa, colonial settlers gained control over land through “agreements”, conquests and 
appropriation. In South Africa, minority white group gained direct control of land through 
conquest (AUC-ECA-AFDB Consortium 2010: 6), and this was consolidated by the Apartheid 
regime. While post-Apartheid state has made efforts to redistribute land through reform scheme, 
black South Africans are still relegated to the background in terms of land ownership and access, 
particularly in the farming sector. As noted by Obeng-Odoom (2012: 165), “land tenure in the 
Apartheid days was marked by segregationist policies which concentrated land in the hands of 
White people”. South Africa settler-colonial experience was characterized by violence and 
domination, inequality and land dispossession. Thus, the society is driven by guilt, historical 
injustice and contemporary inequality, fear, anger and disillusionment (Thiven 2015). Thiven’s 
conception of the land atmosphere forms the foundation upon which farm conflicts should be 
erected. 
Building upon the foundations of the 1997 White Paper on Land Reform, the 2011 Green Paper 
on Land Reform notes that one of the central motivations against colonialism and apartheid was 
the repossession of land lost through force or deceit (Department of Rural Development and Land 
Reform 2011: 2). Thus, “the long-term goal of land reform is social cohesion and development. In 
this text, the concept ‘development’ refers to shared growth and prosperity, relative income  
equality, full employment and cultural progress” (Department of Rural Development and Land 
Reform 2011: 4).  
The reform scheme was founded on the willing (black) buyers and willing (white) sellers, 
facilitated and sponsored by the state (James 2007). The African Union’s template for equitable 
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land reform on the continent recommends the provision of adequate measures. This was to ensure 
that increased market-driven policies of land development favours vulnerable groups, particularly 
women who are mostly involved in farm labour, and eradicate land inequality through costly land 
rights transfer arrangements (AUC-ECA-AfDB Consortium 2010). South Africa has failed to 
achieve this. Therefore, the failed expectations of both farmers and farm dwellers and workers and 
other intrinsic realities find expression in farm attacks and murders. The attempt to accelerate the 
pace of the reform scheme through land expropriation without compensation (LEWC) has not 
doused the volatility of the farming environment.  
Farm attacks and murders have become a sensitive issue in contemporary South Africa. This 
exposes the government’s failure to use land reform as an instrument of socio-political stability. 
The instability in the farming sector and recent categorization of farm attacks as ‘white genocide’ 
has shown the dynamics of the conversation and the urgency to combat farm attacks and erode 
racial discourse in the country. What accounts for attacks/farm murders? Are farm attack/murders 
racial in nature? While farm attacks/murders have dominated public discourse and media, the 
violent character of the state and society can be located in its history. The South African police 
provided an explanation for this trend, “actions which were violent crimes were often seen and 
justified by their perpetrators as a legitimate defense against political opponents and enemies” 
(SAPS 2003: 326).  
The issues around farm attacks are “nuanced and complex” and a holistic approach is required to 
end the farm siege (SAHRC 2014: 12). SAHRC (2014: 12) found that farm attacks thrive due to 
the existence of “criminal environment of impunity” consolidated by ineffective security 
arrangements. Furthermore, farm owners and farm dwellers are the victims of farm attacks, which 
constitutes a human rights violation of both parties. While the ruling party has been accused of 
exaggerating land hunger (Jeffrey 2015), the historical land inequality persists. Land reform aimed 
at promoting agrarian reform by empowering the local population. The quest to attain this faces 
jeopardy because of the prevalence of farm conflict and the associated consequences.  
The article engages literature on the land attacks and ‘white genocide’ debateiscourses, provides a 
nuanced understanding of the recurrence of land and farm conflict in South Africa, and offers 
policy options. The study combines literature withis a reflection of a broader field-study carried 
out through unstructured interviews - to elicit the standpoints - of key actors in the land and 
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agricultural sectors in KwaZulu-Natal and Northern Cape, South Africa (August 2017-May 2020). 
The following categories of participants were interviewed under the principle of anonymity: 2 
academicsscholars, 2 Directors officials of government agencies involved in land reform, 4 farm 
dwellers, 4 farm owners, and 4 land activists (two each from the provinces).  
Land and the Reform Scheme 
In pre-colonial Africa, there was a communal pattern of land ownership, but contemporary African 
societies have been conditioned to relate to land at individual’s level through their exposures to 
the colonial value system. Land was a social property, which engendered the social stabilization 
of African communities. Land was a social property; it engendered the social stabilization of 
African communities. Resane (2018: 3) maintains, that “the farming activities that included tilling 
the land and livestock-keeping were the centrifugal force that cemented the community or tribe. 
The tribal livelihood and survival depended on farming”. Foreign domination distorted Africans’ 
relation to land through its commercialization. They created two opposing groups in the land and 
farming industry (owners of land or farm who are predominantly from the white ,group and the 
landless or farm workers who are black Africans). 
Land connotes different meanings however, its importance to the livelihood of the rural population 
is of universal understanding. Fanon holds, “for a colonised people the most essential value, 
because the most concrete, is first and foremost the land: the land that will bring them bread and, 
above all, dignity” (cited in Pretorius 2014: 29). For Pretorius (2014: 28), “land symbolises the 
ego. If we understand ego as the self, the  I, or, consciousness, then land represents in political 
struggle, a struggle for identity, recognition, civilization.” Indeed, “Africans have an emotional 
attachment to the land. Land is their treasured possession” (Resane 2018: 6). The government 
reiterated land’s importance thus;“If you denied African people access to, and, or, ownership of, 
land, as has been the case under both colonialism and Apartheid in South Africa, you have 
effectively destroyed the very foundation of their existence” (Department of Rural Development 
and Land Reform 2011: 2). Therefore, land is germane to socio-economic development.  
This understanding accounts for the state’s input in the reallocation of land in response to the 
developmental need of respective states in Africa. The African Union policy framework also 
locates land within the African development discourse and enjoins “African governments to pay 
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attention to the status of land administration systems, including land rights delivery systems and 
land governance structures and institutions, and to ensure adequate budgetary provision to land 
policy development and implementation” (AUC-ECA-AfDB Consortium 2010: xi). Decisions on 
land often affect agricultural productivity.  
In 2017, agriculture’s contribution to the GDP was 2.4 per cent. The estimate for Aagriculture 
production for 2017 was estimatedstood at 62.9 million tons compared to the 50.8 million tons 
recorded in 2016 (South African Government 2019a). Agriculture remains one of the main sources 
of employment for many black South Africans and potentially the major generator of economic 
growth and rural development (Resane 2018). Historically, “farming has always been politicized. 
The politics of land in South Africa are so intertwined with farming or agriculture” (Resane 2018: 
3). This politicization has aggravated the farm conflict, which has in turn curtailed the 
maximization of the prospects of agriculture in the country. 
The South African National Development Plan (NDP), published in 2012, was a broad vision of 
combating structural violence that characterized the country’s landscape: elimination of poverty 
and reduction of inequality by 2030 (South African Government 2019b). Through NDP, the 
government reiterated its decision to respond appropriately to the widely differing needs and 
aspirations of people for land, in both urban and rural areas, in a manner that is both equitable and 
affordable, and at the same time contribute to poverty alleviation and national economic growth 
(Department of Land Affairs 1997: 10). Furthermore, the policy paper aimed to “extend security 
of tenure to the millions of people who live in insecure arrangements on land belonging to other 
people, especially in the predominantly white farming areas” (Department of Land Affairs 1997: 
11). 
While land reform was implemented by many African states, the case of South Africa was peculiar. 
The reform programme was a reaction to the 1913 (June 19) Natives Land Act that saw thousands 
of black families forcibly removed from their land by the apartheid government. The Act denied 
the black from buying or occupying land, restricted their land ownership to 7 per cent, and later 
13per cent through the 1936 Native Trust and Land Act of South Africa. The apartheid government 
relocated black people to poorly-planned homelands. Land reform became the instrument for 
addressing the historical land dispossessions and land-related inequality that had threatened 
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economic development, racial harmony and socio-political stability. Despite the optimism that 
occasioned this scheme, the reform exercise has been very slow, ineffective and failed to redress 
land inequality.  
Obeng-Odoom (2012: 165) asserts, “overall, the land reforms in South Africa have not been as 
effective as promised. Land tenure in South Africa remains insecure and land-based inequality is 
prevalent.” Indeed, “current policy frameworks are muddled and the strategic thrust of the 
programme is unclear, partly because it is not seen as contributing to a wider process of agrarian 
reform. Little support for black smallholder farmers is offered” (Cousins nd: 1). For example, only 
11,1 per cent of the households involved in agriculture reported getting agriculture-related support 
from the government. Nationally, slightly more than 2,2 per cent of the households reported to 
have received training and 7,0 per cent received dipping livestock vaccination services (South 
African Government 2019a). 
Commenting on transferred land, many of the new beneficiaries opted to farm directly on the land 
at individual or group levels, while in other cases, lack of capital and other supporting systems 
(required for both small-scale and commercial farming) has forced new owners to lease the land 
back to the white (Hall 2004). In 2013, only about 8 per cent of the 76 000 successful land 
claimants had opted to have their land restored to them. The others, constituting about 71 000 (92 
per cent) chose cash instead of getting trapped in farming without the required institutional support 
system (Akinola 2018). Christo van der Rheede, the leader of AHi Business Chamber maintains, 
“existing farmers are ideally positioned to expand the value chain for agricultural products, but 
they are confronted by contradictory statements about land policies, unsafe circumstances, crime 
and increasing input costs which discourages them even more” (Smith 2015). According to Jeffrey 
(2015), between 73 per cent and 90 per cent of land reform projects have failed to yield the desired 
results. It has left beneficiaries with neither food to sell nor employment to provide them with 
means of livelihood. 
The reform agenda, anchored on the restitution, redistribution and tenure security, was 
implemented through the ‘willing seller, willing buyer’ model. This was an element of the 
liberalization of the country’s economy. Under the market-led approach to land reform, the state 
provides the funding for the purchase of land and related infrastructures, which has become a big 
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logistical and financial challenges. Hall (2004: 219) further comments on the problematic thus, 
“while adopting ambitious policy and targets, we have a shrinking state with inadequate 
institutional and financial resources.” The willing seller, willing buyer was too costly for the 
government and the absence of effective institution to manage it accounted for land policy struggle.  
Data on the performances of land redistributed are not that reliable due to the difficulty in 
ascertaining farms privately acquired and those acquired through the government reform scheme. 
However, the government had claimed that 90% percent of the land redistribution projects, other 
empirical evidence holds that about 50% of the programmes have somehow improved the 
livelihoods of beneficiaries (Cousins 2018). Indeed, many of the new beneficiaries of farmland 
has no interest in farming, while others lacks institutional supports such as poor infrastructures, 
absence of skills acquisition programmes, and lack of capital or inadequate financial resources. 
Indeed, Tthe black poor have no resource to purchase land. To complicate this, the price of land 
has continued to rise since 1999, while a section of the land acquired by the state is yet to be 
redistributed (Keke and Hall 2018: 83).  
Furthermore, the state-sponsored approach protects the white commercial farmers and allows for 
maximization of profits by land owners and other private groups that made land available for sale 
(Obeng-Odoom: 165). Overall, policy inconsistency has trailed the reform scheme, which has 
negatively affected agricultural buoyancy. For instance, African National Congress (ANC) has 
proposed 12 000 hectares as the maximum size of land (land cap) that farmers may own and that 
foreigners would be denied the opportunity to own land (Akinola 2018; Jeffrey 2015; Smith 2015). 
This has reduced the motivation to invest in the sector.  
Actors on the Farm: Interests and Reality 
The farming community is comprised of many actors, which are categorized under the following 
groupings: farm owners, dwellers, workers, and labour tenants. The government, which is also an 
actor, absorbs pressures from the other actors for the attainment of their respective interests. A 
pro-white organization, AfriForum, has accused the government of complicity. The organization 
enjoins the government to be more proactive due to the negative effects of farm attacks on the 
farming communities, especially the farmers and farm labourers, who stand a higher risk of losses 




Farm owners or farmers are predominantly made up of the white group who, in most cases, 
inherited the farms from their fathers or great grandfathers. In most cases, these lands and farms 
had been forcefully taken from black South Africans during colonialism and apartheid. However, 
few white farmers had genuinely bought the lands, particularly in post-Apartheid South Africa. 
While the white group are generally the farm owners, a report establishes that since 1994, most of 
the black Ministers or their families owned between two (2) and five (5) big farms each (KZNN 
2009: 3). This fact has received sparse attention in scholarship and public discourses. Generally, 
white farmers are the victims of attacks and murders and have also experienced vandalisation of 
their properties (some are not farm-related property). Many of these acts of vandalism are not 
usually reported to the police. The farmers have consistently faulted government policy on land, 
which they believed favours the blacks and antithetical to food security and agricultural 
productivity.   
The farmers believe that the government lacks the capacity to successfully drive the land reform 
process. The government lacks transparency in the registration of land claims and the officials of 
key agencies involved with land and agriculture such as the Departments of Land Affairs and Land 
Claims Commission are more favourably disposed towards land claimants and farm workers. 
Furthermore, government has failed to compensate the farmers for improvements made on the 
farms after a claim has been launched. Indeed, registered land claims on a farm disqualify the 
farmer from obtaining bank loans, thereby curtailing productivity and farm viability. This was also 
identified as part of the reasons for the declining employment opportunities in farms.  
Farmers have also complained about how they have been frustrated out of the farming industry 
due to uncertain land policies and failed government promises, thereby jeopardizing food security, 
and market buoyancy. Therefore, some farmers show hostility toward the government and its 
agencies but are more receptive to the private sectors. Few have shown willingness to share their 
farming skills with the beneficiaries through mentorship programmes. The famers have also 
complained of the unwillingness of some of the targeted populations to seriously partake in such 
training or mentorship programmes. A farmer in Northern CapeOne of the respondents noted that, 
“the present young South Africans are not willing to become farm owners. They are not just 




Farm dwellers, otherwise called farm occupiers, are made up predominantly of black South 
Africans most of whom had been born and bred on the farm and had regarded the farm as their 
home (both physical and spiritual). Most are farm workers; some only live on the farm and working 
somewhere else. Many of them are children or adults living with their parents (farm or not farm 
workers), others have some forms of relationships with the farmers. Thus, such relationships form 
the bases of their residing on the farms. These are the categories of people that are subjected to 
incessant evictions from farms, which they conceive as their homes. Usually, there is a spiritual 
attachment to farm settlements because some have had their ancestors buried on the farms (their 
graves are very visible). This accounts for their oppositions to evictions.  
The farmers often use farm dwellers as cheap labour or declare them a liability if they object to 
being used as cattle herders, sheep shearers, fence menders, tractor loaders or any other domestic 
work. A civil society organization involved in land issues, KwaZulu-Natal Christian Council 
(KNCC) presents the relationship between the dwellers and farmers in the following terms, 
“Most farm workers work throughout the month and have little free time, at month end 
they are paid and the truck takes all workers to the farmers’ shop and then to the farmer’s 
bottle store in the farm; in this way, the farm dwellers are in a no exit situation, and have 
no access to accurate information about party political developments, good health life 
styles or micro-economic development. Farm workers or farm dwellers are often suspected 
to be the perpetrators or collaborators in criminal violence experienced in farms” (KNCC 
2009: 3). 
The farm dwellers are very vulnerable and their relationships with the white farmers are a 
combination of both respect and conflict, as the case may be. A point of major discord between 
them and farm owners is the former’s exemptions from the decision making process on farms. This 
negatively affects their negotiating power in respects of remunerations, shelters and access to 
infrastructures. 
Farm Labour 
Farm labour, otherwise called farm workers, are predominantly black South Africans who are very 
poor, disadvantaged and landless. Majority are predominantly illiterates and rural dwellers, 
without significant social security. Farmers poorly remunerate them, and remuneration is very 
often in the form of food and shelter. The farms they work are purely private property of white 
farmers, who sparingly provide educational or infrastructural facilities. Their survivals are 
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dependent on the benevolence of the farmers. The lack of human capacity opportunities constitutes 
what KNCC (2009: 3) termed “a generational economic deprivation”. Most of the farm workers 
reside on farms, while very few lives off the farms. While the 1997 official document on land 
reform identifies this group as the major target of land redistribution, decades after the 
implementation of land reform, they remain largely landless and deprived of other necessities of 
life.  
As reported by many of the respondentsparticipants, the lack of access to agricultural land has 
turned some of these groups into ‘frustrated and hostile’ farm labourers, with high expectations 
(sometimes unrealistic) from the white farmers. Some of the workers claimed to have been trained 
(locally and informally) as small-scale farmers but no access to land and support system for 
farming. They strongly hold that land reform should target the 200 000 market-oriented, black 
smallholder farmers who produce crops and livestock for sale at local markets. On the other hand, 
Lahiff (2008) believes that farm unproductivity is prevalent because many hitherto farm dwellers 
or workers who were allocated farms or land through the redistributive policy have become 
farmers, without farming management skills. These opposing standpoints are parts of the 
complexities of South African land reform programmes.  
Labour Tenants 
Farm Tenants are those farm workers who permanently live and work on the farms. The residential 
space and facilities (water, electricity, limited space for gardens, and accommodation in few cases) 
are provided by the farmers. The inadequacy of these facilities are sources of conflict on farms. 
They are constantly subjected to evictions and opt to continue to work under untenable labour 
practices due to the fear of losing their residential or other opportunities. While some have been 
relocated to new lands and farms, many have been evicted while their claims await official 
attention (Lahiff 2008: 4). Undeniably, they are the most neglected actors on the farm. Despite the 
government’s assurances that the most serious and desperate needs would command its urgent 
attention (Kepe and Hall 2018: 45); decades after this promise, the situation on the farm has 
remained unchanged.  
Labour tenants constitute the most vociferous actors on the farm. Some farmers subject them to 
the most inhumane lifestyle. Their major grouse against the farm owners center on the poor service 
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delivery that characterises settlements. In their perspective, the farmers are exploiting their 
vulnerability by engaging in untenable labour practices. The farmers, on the other hand, blame the 
government and some non-state actors for extending to the workers ‘unattainable expectations and 
promises.’ Government officials and NGOs have proclaimed many changes in farmer-worker 
relations without due consultation with the farmers.  
Reality of Farm Murder 
Farm attacks are not an illusion but a reality. While the white farmers have been the major victims 
of farm murders since 1994, there are few cases where black South Africans have become the 
victims. For instance, a white farmer allegedly shot and killed Anele Hoyana, in a manner that 
connotes racism. One of the opposition parties, Economic Freedom Fighter (EFF) vowed to 
‘expropriate’ the farmer’s land and property (Head 2019). This nearly became a racial 
confrontation. The recent racialization of farm attacks/murders have called into question the 
meaning and scope of farm attacks. Swart (2003: 40) maintains, 
“The concept "farm attack" is a comprehensive concept which covers various actions 
which are directed at causing damage and pain to farmers and their defendants, workers, 
property and possessions. A farm attack is a situation in which the inhabitants of a farm 
are physically attacked with a specific objective in mind. This objective may be to murder, 
rape, rob or to inflict physical harm”. 
Furthermore, the South African Police Service defines farm attacks as, 
“… acts aimed at the person of residents, workers and visitors to farms and smallholdings, 
whether with the intent to murder, rape, rob or inflict bodily harm. In addition, all actions 
aimed at disrupting farming activities as a commercial concern, whether for motives 
related to ideology, labour disputes, land issues, revenge, grievances, racist concerns or 
intimidation, should be included” (SAPS 2003: 417).  
Farm attacks in the country are characterised by “calculated military precision, the presence of 
strangers in the area, black and white farmers as victims, gang activities, threats, vulnerability, the 
status of the victim, false identification, ambuscade, arson, the time of attack and organised crime” 
(Strydom and Schutte 2005). According to one of the victims of farm murders, Afriforum: 
“Farm murders have become a very unique phenomenon in South Africa, not only in terms 
of the extremely high frequency at which South African farmers (of which the vast majority 
are from minority communities) are murdered, but also the extreme levels of brutality and 
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torture that characterise these crimes. Unfortunately, this is also a phenomenon that the 
South African government mostly chooses to ignore” (Afriforum 2015: 3). 
Farm attacks became a major concern in the new South Africa few years after the end of apartheid. 
The rise in farm attacks from 433 in 1997 to 767 in 1998 compelled President Nelson Mandela to 
convene the Rural Safety Summit on 10 October 1998 (SAPS 2003: 15). The Summit aimed “to 
achieve consensus around a future process to deal with rural safety in general and farm attacks in 
particular and to improve existing strategies and to develop new plans of action” (SAPS 2003: 15).  
The Guardian (2018) captures the underlining trend and motives of farm murders since 1998. 
South Africa, “has 9% of its population controlling a little bit more than 70 percent of farmland in 
the country…That 9% is overwhelmingly white” (The Guardian 2018). The World Bank attests to 
the fact that “the chronically poor group is almost exclusively made up of black and coloured South 
Africans” (Greenwood 2018). In 2015, the University of South Africa revealed that the top one 
percent of South Africans own 70.9 per cent of the country’s wealth while the bottom 60 per cent 
only own 7 per cent (Greewood 2018). Thus, there is always a friction between the wealthy farmers 
and poor farm workers, which finds expression in farm attacks. After the 1998 peak period during 
which 153 farmers died, there was a steady decline in the rate of farm attacks/murders until 
2011.The table below presents the rate of farm murders in the country.  
Transvaal Agricultural Union (TAU) reported 64 murders on farms in 2015, 71 in 2016, and 68 
Table 1: The Rate of Farm Murders 
Year Farm Murders 











While itIt is crucial to understand farm attacks within the entire socio-political and economic 
interaction of the revolutionary and post-apartheid atmospheres, it is also important to reveal which 
is of the broad criminal nature of the South African social landscape as shown in Table 2 and Table 
3. This is mostly attributed to the poor socio-economic conditions, particularly in rural areas. 
However, there are compelling reasons to identify certain trends and patterns that point to specific 
motives (Swart 2003). Thus, the study presents the general trend of murders (including farm 
murders) in the country. Based on SAPS’ report, there were 19,016 documented murders in South 
Africa in 2016-17 (BBC 2018). According to the mid-year estimate for 2016, there were 
55,908,900 people in South Africa, and based on this projection, there were 34 murders for every 
100,000 people in the country (BBC 2018). 
Since 2012, there have been a total of 3 059 attacks reported to police, averaging 510 attacks a 
year in which 338 people - roughly 56 a year - were killed (Chiotta 2019). Based on the statistics 
released by SAPS, a total of 21 022 people were murdered in 2018/19 period, which constitutes 
athere has been a 35 per cent rise in murders since 2011/12 and a 3.4 per cent rise since 2017/18 
(SAPS 2019: 16). The table below reveals the nature and rate of crime in the country in 2018/2019 
and 2019/2020. 
Table 2: Crime Statistic in South Africa 
Year 2018/2019 2019/2020 Average rate per 
year in 2019/2020 
Contact Crime 617, 210 621, 282 1,702 
Murder 21, 022 21, 325 58 
Robbery with aggravating 
circumstances 
140, 032 143, 990 394 
Burglary at residential 
premises 
71, 224 67, 713 186 
Source SAPS (2020: 5-6) and data on average rate per year was calculated by the author. 
It is also instructive to present the place of occurrence of the contact crimes for proper 
understanding of crime in South Africa generally and crime committed on the farms. The table 
below shows crime locations. 
Table 3: Crime Locations in South Africa 
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Agricultural Land 161 397 711 128 166 
Residences of perpetrators/victims 
including residence known by 




33, 933 29, 751 4, 754 5, 522 
Source SAPS (2020:17)  
 
At average, 58 people are murdered daily in the following order: 47 men, 8 women and 3 children. 
Indeed, 50 per cent of murders happen on weekends and 50 per cent of the murders occur in just 
13 per cent of police territories (SAPS 2019: 26).  
The 2018/19 crime statistics released by SAPS on violence on farms and small holdings revealed; 
44 murders (in 41 incidents), 22 robberies at residences and 2 robberies off-residences, 7 cases of 
attempted murders, 2 assaults, 2 thefts of motor vehicles and a stock theft (SAPS 2019: 37). The 
police also had their own share of the rising murders. In the year under review, 28 on-duty police 
officers and 49 off-duty police officers were murdered (SAPS 2019: 35). The 2018/19 crime 
statistics released by SAPS on violence on farms and small holdings revealed; 44 murders (in 41 
incidents), 22 robberies at residences and 2 robberies off-residences, 7 cases of attempted murders, 
2 assaults, 2 thefts of motor vehicles and a stock theft (SAPS 2019: 37). These statistics support 
the high incidences of crime in South Africa in general and the prevalence of farm attacks/murders, 
which and also  reveals the reason for the racialization of farm murders. 
Farm Murder and ‘White Genocide’ Discourse  
Over the years, South Africa has continued to downplay the resurgence of racism; however, the 
attacks on farms and murders of white farmers have led to the racialization of farm conflict under 
the tag, ‘white genocide’. Genocide relates to the deliberate killing of a large group of people of a 
particular nation, race or ethnicity. The aim of such killings is the complete extermination of the 
group. In South Africa, large-scale farming is associated with the white race, any issue relating to 
such farming would involve the white group. As reinforced by Resane (2018: 3), “farming is a 
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white business, and although the black people are still struggling to regain the land, commercial 
farming is still a white monopoly”. Thus, racism is a construction that is closely associated with 
the South African historical reality: history of land dispossessions, evictions and dehumanization 
of farm workers. The government, that was trusted by the black population, has found itself trapped 
between radicalism and liberalism. 
South Africa opted for a “radical liberal democratic constitution” after Apartheid (Thiven 2015: 
2). As a constitutional democracy, the extent to which the government can continue its rhetoric of 
the radicalization of the economy is highly compromised. Despite the rhetoric about black 
empowerment and affirmative action, gross inequality and disempowerment continue. Therefore, 
the government has failed to deliver on land reform. Thiven (2015: 13) maintains, “Inequalities of 
the past are reproduced, and despite a superficial black cultural assertiveness, blacks are still 
subordinate in all the areas that matter, from economics to media, literature and the arts”. South 
Africa is comprised of a dual society: “one white and rich and one black and poor” (Pretorius 2014: 
28). That is, there is the vast black majority who live in frustration, anger and abject squalor, and 
the minority who live in guilt, fear and wealth (Thiven 2015). 
While the government have realized the imperative of adopting the LEWC as the most viable 
instrument for redressing land inequality, the white farmers, investors, bankers and white-
dominated civil society groups such as AgriSA and AfriForum continue to be pessimistic about its 
implementation. The government maintains that contrary to expectations, expropriation would 
enhance food security and land productivity, promote equitable spatial justice and redistribution 
of wealth. Antagonists of the LEWC keep raising fundamental questions on the appropriateness of 
the policy and the uncertainties surrounding its implementation (Akinola 2020). The amendment 
of Section 25 of the Constitution and the publication of the summary of the expropriation bill - on 
9 October 2020 - have revealed the conditions for and guidelines on LEWC (Department of Public 
Works and Infrastructure 2020). Despite these, there are still raging oppositions from the white 
minority who claims that LEWC have been politicized and remained a tyrannical policy that 
reinforces racial discrimination. However, it remains unclear how LEWC would facilitate peaceful 
relations between the predominantly white farmers and black farm workers. 
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Despite the high incidences of farm attacks during the first decade of democracy, the 2003 SAPS 
report deracialized farm attacks and conceptualized it as other forms of crime. Indeed, farm attacks 
are not only peculiar to white commercial farmers, it occurs in both commercial farms and 
smallholdings. One of the participants, Director in the Department of Rural Development and Land 
Reform, Kimberley opposed any attempt to apportion special attention to farm attacks and 
comments thus: 
“Why is farm conflict treated differently and generated much public attention? How is it 
different from any other societal conflict in the country? There are all kinds of violent 
conflict in the society that did not attract such attentions. People are being killed in 
different settlements, informal structures, domestic violence is rising, and violent protests 
continue to take lives of many. There is the need for government to approach land conflict 
like other criminalities crime in the society. The privileged position of the whites has led 
to the sensitization and politicization of farm conflicts. It has been blown out of proportion 
to generate pity from the population and external actors. Indeed, it has become a strategy 
for emotional blackmail”. 
TAU, and TLU SA, comprising mainly white farmers from the former Transvaal Farmers’ Union, 
has been critical of the government for not swiftly and directly responding to the spate of murders 
on farms, and categorizing it as a national emergency (BBC 2019; Erik 2019). President Cyril 
Ramaphosa responded to the allegation of passivity in the face of increased murders of farm 
workers, condemned the racialization of farm murders and maintains that, “every life in the country 
has equal value and every murder, every violent crime, must be equally and unequivocally 
condemned” (Erik 2019). No doubt, the white farmers are the major victims, but in retrospect, the 
commercial farming industries are predominantly owned by the white minority groupwhite 
minority group predominantly owns the commercial farming industries.   
Despite the attempts to deracialize farm attacks, the white farming communities continue to raise 
alarm over the increasing farm murders, their brutality and what they consider to be ‘white 
genocide’. They hold the perspectives that farm attacks deviate from ‘normal crimes’ principally 
because of the ‘military precision’ exhibited by the attackers, complicity of the police, and the 
objects of the crime are white minority. They concluded, “that farm attacks were politically 
inspired and that the real aim was to drive the (white) farmers off the land so that the land could 
be occupied by the (black) majority” (SAPS 2003). South Africa Today (2016) presents detailed 
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accounts of nine farm murders that occurred in a sensitive manner, which was the foundation for 
the recent politicalization and racialization of farm attacks.  
The non-categorization of farm murder as special crime has also inflamed the politicization of 
farm murders. Therefore, Ffarm attacks/murders seem no longer categorized under the general 
criminality but consequently found expressions in racial discrimination. Thus, ‘white genocide’ 
has become a racially-inclined rhetoric, which depicts farm murders as systematic acts orchestrated 
by the black race and supported by the black-led government. This was aimed at gradually 
exterminating the white farmers and ultimately inheriting their farms and other private property. 
Although categorizing farm attacks as genocide seems appealing, but the fact, as highlighted by 
the aforementioned statistics on general crime rates and farm murders, reveals a contrary 
conversation.  
Factors Responsible for Farm Attacks  
The most decisive complexity around the farm conflict narrative are the diverse perceptions of the 
land conflict. A deep-seated belief by the farmers is their rightful claims to the land they occupy. 
They continue to reject the link between the apartheid history of land dispossession and their land 
wealth. Farmers are living under both real and unreal threats to their lives and property. They 
believe that both the black population and government officials relates to them through racial lens. 
However, the landless farm workers see this as the height of blatant distortion of history, arrogance, 
injustice and impunity. A farm activist in Pietermaritzburgparticipant submits, 
“The major cause of farm conflict is the maltreatment and dehumanization of farm 
labourers. It is structural violence at its peak. Apartheid may have politically ended. 
Apartheid may have been removed from the cities and parliament. But, in the farm, the 
employer-labour relations that existed during the apartheid regime still persists in the 
farms. The discussions should be directed more at the cause of farm conflict and not the 
outcomes of farm violence”.  
The justice system has failed to protect farm dwellers, or act against the highhandedness of 
landowners, and the inability to provide free legal aid as mandated by the 2001 Nkuzi judgement 
has put a snag in the reform scheme (Lahiff 2008: 4). Farm dwellers believe that the portion of the 
land on which they stay and work is rightfully theirs. They keep protesting against the 
commercialization or monetization of access to land, which they conceive as their birthright. In 
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their perspective, land is an inalienable possession, hence they fail to understand why they should 
purchase what naturally belongs to them (James 2007, 24). In other instances, farm workers 
accused the farmers of apportioning to them lands that have been harvested. The revitalization of 
such land requires a lot ofmany resources. Agriculture is the heartbeat of rural economy in the 
country, and land is a factor of production and an economic resource. An academic in the 
University of KwaZulu-Natal participant puts it clearly, “denials of land and its produce engenders 
(sic) poverty and disillusionment, and these are grounds for aggressions against farm owners. The 
point to note is, farm dwellers strongly believe that the land they work originally belong to them.”  
John L. Dube presented the crux of the conflict, “The black ox has nowhere to feed, and the white 
ox has all the pasture” (Department of Rural Development & Land Reform 2011: 11). The 
academicA participant further reinforces this analogy and explains,  
“Farm conflict is the consequence of decades of un-addressed land inequality in the 
country, and particularly in the farms. It is reaction against oppressions in the farm. It is 
the height of an expression of consistent abuse of the rights of farm workers or labour 
tenants. Violence should be condemned in all ramifications in the farms, but we all know 
why it happens”.  
Generally, the following are the identifiable motives for farm attacks and murders: the 
institutionalization and pervasiveness of violence, increasing poverty, unemployment and socio-
economic crisis, retaliation, history of land dispossession and forceful evictions, untenable labour 
practices and labour-employers power relations, free access to armaments, failed land reform 
schemes, breakdown of community policing, and ineffective security apparatus. 
The white farmers have particularly blamed the police and judicial system for ineffective policing 
and injustice. Based on the findings of AfriForum, “in more than half of cases investigated, the 
criminals escaped. Of the 41% of suspects that were arrested, 39% were charged but only 23% 
were sentenced” (2015). The table below gives more understanding of the frustrations of the white 
farmers against the police and judiciary.  









Appeared in Court 29% 
Convicted 23% 
Sentenced 23% 
Source: AfriForum (2015: 18). 
As shown by the table, the police did not convict majority of the perpetrators were not convicted, 
fueling the notion that the police are especially complicit. In contrast, farm workers have also 
accused the police of favouring farm owners. Thus, the police have not been regarded as neutral 
thus complicating the quest for peace and harmony on farms (KZCC 2009).  
Furthermore, most of the participants unanimously hold the government responsible for farm 
conflicts. Some accused the government of lacking the political will to confront the white farmers 
and expropriate their land, while others have opposed such an act and claimed that the political 
class actually aggravated social and racial tensions on farms through their ‘negative’ oratory 
prowess. For instance, the use of the slogan, “Kill the boer, kill the farmer!” by politicians is 
“illwilled” (sic) and constitute a “dangerous ideology” (AfriForum 2015: 4). A farmer in Richards 
Bay areaparticipant pointedly accused the EFF of trying to incite the poor to engage in land 
grabbing and forcing the white farmers off the land. While this appeals to the masses, it would 
jeopardize food security and aggravate the unemployment crisis that has rocked the country, 
particularly the farming sector. The participant submits, “All conflict on the land question and all 
agitation by the blacks are directed at ‘inheriting’ whites’ commercial land, period.” 
A study revealed that about 33 per cent of the economically active population of a local 
municipality in KwaZulu-Natal work in the white-dominated agricultural sector (KRCC 2019: 2). 
The KNCC report highlighted the cordial relationship between farmers and workers in part of 
KwaZulu-Natal. The report reveals, “apart from providing job opportunities, farmers have built 
schools, provided facilities to promote the culture of learning and teaching and also provided 
internships opportunities for those pursuing a career in agriculture” (KRCC 2019: 2). The workers 
also offered security and protection to the farmers, their families and property. But overtime, this 
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flow of mutualism was distorted, and engendered a new wave of “acrimonious relations between 
farm dwellers (people born in farms and grew up there and have no other homes) and new farm 
owners” (KNCC 2009: 2). Usually, if the principal worker becomes incapacitated or reached a 
retirement age, labour is transferred to siblings who continue to work on the farm. Vice versa, 
white farmers usually transfer farm ownerships to their children and new buyers. These new actors 
on the farm (farmers and workers) have failed, in many cases, to uphold the cordial relationship 
between each other.  
Conclusion: Combating Farm Attacks and Deracializing Farm Murders 
The study has located the land conflict and ‘white genocide’ in historical and contemporary 
contexts. It has successfully downplayed the use of the tag, ‘white genocide’ as a representation 
of the reality of land attacks. Indeed, farmers have experienced consistent attacks, which are 
condemnable; however, the general trend of crime in the country calls for concern. The 
government needs to invest in security and diffuse the hostility between farmers and dwellers 
through an effective land reform scheme that benefits all the actors and an implementation of 
enlightenment programmes to correct negative perspectives based on historical facts. When there 
is a conflict between a dweller and farmer, the former mobilizes members of the black community 
(either on farm or off-farm) against the latter and other farmers in the locality. Vice-versa, the 
farmers sometimes display hostility to all workers and other farm dwellers when one of the workers 
default.  
Land reform has faced the challenge of sketching out long term planning scenarios or effective 
implementation strategies. Also, the scourge of criminality and instability on the farm has the 
potential to cripple the shaky agricultural community. South Africa occupies land that is 
predominantly infertile. This accounts for the scramble for fertile lands, mostly found in rain forest 
in Gauteng and KwaZulu-Natal Provinces. As noted by Lahiff (2008), the drivers of the reform 
agenda have particularly neglected dwellers on commercial farms, (including farm workers and 
their dependents), and labour tenants in KwaZulu-Natal and Mpumalanga Provinces. More than a 
decade after this revelation, the government is yet to address this. 
The agitations of the rural poor are not too complex to grasp, but the government and other 
stakeholders should develop a better understanding of the perspectives of white farmers on issues 
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pertaining to farm conflict, labour relation, criminality and land claims. The emotive supports for 
the landless, victims of hostile labour relations on farms and other demands by black South 
Africans are so strong that they dwarf the frustrations and plights of the white farmers. All parties 
should be united for effective resolution of the conflict. The conversation, most times, ignores the 
overriding interest of the state: agricultural sustainability, economic development, political 
stability and social cohesion. Land reform is a prerequisite for peace and justice in the country, 
and also reinforce the importance of land and agricultural sectors to socio-economic development.  
Apartheid has ended, and from political standpoint, the government continues to promote non-
racial cultures; however, a greater number of the farming communities have not been decolonized. 
The unequal power relations between farmers and black workers remain unchanged. Any attempt 
to separate ‘farm attacks’ from other forms of crimes might reinforce the ‘seeming’ importance of 
the victims of attacks, and strengthen the claim that the white group is still the privileged group in 
post-Apartheid South Africa. 
While there are accusations and counter accusations between farmers and dwellers, the general 
consensusconsensus shows the deep-rooted fear and mistrust amongst the farming communities, 
which negatively affect the communication flowsocial cohesion between farmers and farm 
occupiers. This aggravates the fragility of their co-existence and jeopardizes social cohesion and 
agricultural productivity. Experience has shown that effective land management would engender 
improvement in agricultural productivity in developing countries (Obeng-Odoom 2012). In 
contrast, distorted land policy and farm conflict would curtail agricultural productivity. Indeed, the 
loss of lives during violent conflicts reduces the availability of skilled personnel on farms and 
impedes future racial harmony in the country. 
Both white farmers and black farm dwellers acknowledge the failure of the land reform scheme. 
to properly address their expectations. The farmers support the enhancement of their property 
rights and the security of their lives and property, while the farm dwellers advocate for their land 
rights and implementation of LEWCland expropriation without compensation. This is predicated 
upon the belief that the land and even farms, originally belong to black Africans. The argument, 
“we have heavily invested our resources on the land and farms,” has no place in the hearts of many 
of the farm dwellers and South African blacks in general. Thus, they do not consider the theft of 
the farmers’ property and physical assaults as criminal acts.  
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The perspectives of the two divides are antithetical to enduring peace and harmony on the farms. 
There is need for compromise in resolving the land question. The farmers, when required should 
be willing to genuinely engage with other stakeholders, even when part of their land assets could 
face redistribution, while farm dwellers should be willing to accept the farmers as partners in the 
post-conflict reconstruction of the ‘new’ South Africa. Overall, the government has the 
responsibility to balance the quest for justice, social harmony and state survival.   
Specific Recommendations 
1) The land question is still unresolved. Land inequality persists in South Africa. 
IndeedWhile, the onus to address farm attacks/murders rest mostly on the government, . 
Thus, the government should be neutral and implement policies that are proactive and not 
inflame the volatility of the tensed-farming environments. It is important to engage with 
all the actors on the farm before any government’s policy interventions. The government 
should adopt a pragmatic approach to redistributing land through expansive consultations 
with landowners and the landless.  
2) Another means of addressing the land question is through theGovernment should 
implementation of policy that will enhance the gradual integration of many of the workers 
into the farming business. Capacity workshops and training should be organised by state 
and non-state actors involved in the peace and development of the farming community. 
The government and non-state actors should facilitate Sskills transfers from the white 
farmers to emerging farmers, including identifiable farm dwellers., should be facilitated. 
3) The government may favour mechanized farming under the management of highly skilled 
farmers, but must also provide support systems for the development of small-scale farming, 
which remains a main source of livelihood for the rural population. Thus, agrarian reform 
should be revisited.  
4) The government should facilitate the convergence of information on farm attacks/murders 
and status of land reform, among all the stakeholders such as AGRI-SA, AfriForum, the 
police and government departments. A sustainable policy is based on accurate information, 
and this is clearly lacking.  
5) While government is seriously considering a policy shift, an effective peace between farm 
owners and workers depend on the revocation of the willing seller, willing buyer land 
model, which has complicated the quest for land redistribution. Black South Africans who 
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are predominantly farm dwellers have no financial capacity to compete in the land market, 
and this generates frustration and aggression against farm owners.  
6) There is a need to de-politicized farm attacks. Thus, Ffarm murders/attacks should be 
declared ‘a special crime’ and an emergency, just like ‘gender-violence’. Issues on farm 
attacks should not be used for scoring political points. Furthermore, a special police should 
be trained and empowered and trained to deal with the complexity of crimes on the farm, 
and those guilty of farm attacks/murders should be prosecuted by the judiciary.  
7) The landless and historically disadvantaged should be provided with more access to land, 
particularly arable land. This is the right step in deracializing land discourse and farm 
conflict. The government should also change the land narratives from the racist lens to the 
imperativeness of creating a just and equitablemore balanced society.  
8) Government and non-state actors should invest in workshops to implant where civil and 
peace education will be implanted into the consciousness of actors on the farms.  
9) Government should be more decisive on implementing inclusive land policy that is 
inclusive and refrain from creating policy uncertainty that currently exist. 
10) Government must inaugurate a ‘Panel of the Wise’, comprising of well-respected elders 
from all races to be involved in the peace processes on the farms.  
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